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GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

In this paper
stitutional
the United
exercise

I intend to examine

equality
States

principles

and Europe.

in constitutional

the influence

of con-

on choice of law decisions
Therefore,

law, conflict

this analysis

in

is an

of laws and compara-

tive law.
Part I is an inquiry
porary

significance

Constitution
not intend

into the origin,

of an important

and its guarantees

part of the United

of equality.

to deal here exhaustively

the non-discrimination
implications

state autonomy
concentrate

clauses:

of contemporary
in deciding

role and contemStates

However,

I do

with all the aspects

my goal is to clarify

Fourteenth
conflict

on state discrimination

Amendment

of

the

theory

cases.

Therefore,

against

non-residents

for

I will
and

aliens.
Under
Court

settled

is empowered

discrimination
has developed

principles
to define

principles

approach

that anti-

whereby

As we will

different

the classifications
I

tests

of legislaunlike

classification"

to strict Equal Protection

I will argue that

The court

see, non-residency,

has not been held to be a "suspect

and is thus not subject
However,

the obligations

the Supreme

to the degree of "suspectness"

tive classifications.
alienage,

review,

impose upon the states.

a multi-tiered

are used according

of judicial

scrutiny.

that

2
distinguish

locals

from out-of-staters

are, in my opinion,

suspect

and that they should, therefore,

highest

scrutiny

under the Equal Protection

In Part II, I will attempt
modern

see the influence

in this area is mainly
places

to describe

choice of law methodologies

we will

be subjected

exercised

Clause.
traditional

in the United

of the United

to the

and

States.

As

States Constitution

through

the limitations

it

on the power of the states to shape their own choice

of law rules.

The measure

Court has varied

of federal control

by the Supreme

from time to time and from field to field.

But so far, the Supreme
choice of law decision

Court has not invalidated
on the basis of either

a state's

antidiscrimina-

tion provision.
I will argue that several modern
their systematic

preference

Equal Protection

Clause

theories,

because

for forum residents,

of the United

of

violate

the

States Constitution

that it is time for the Supreme Court to control

and

this ten-

dency.
In Part III, I will make a brief comparative
the European
differences

conflicts
between

methodologies.
"Conflicts

American

The European

Resolution"

of law methodologies
question

system.

is whether

reaction

choice of law

to the American

and its influence

will be examined.

choice of law decisions

of

I will point out the basic

and European

the European

analysis

on European
Another

Community

made by its Member

choice

interesting

has any impact on
States.

3
Finally,

I will discuss

stitutional

Court,

stitutional

equality

the decisions

establishing
principles

of the German

an interaction

between

Concon-

and choice of law rules.

PART I.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CONSTITUTION

CLAUSE OF THE UNITED

CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION

A

TO EQUAL PROTECTION

The first and basic step in Equal Protection
must consist
Equality

of looking at the concept
is the only concept

ferent treatment

of people

that forces us to consider
relationship
justify

analysis

of equality

as such.

that tells us that dif-

does matter.

It is the concept

how society treats people

to one another.

inequalities

STATES

in

It forces the government

that might otherwise

go unnoticed

to
or

unremedied.1
We all implicitly

have an idea of what

"equality"

We know what equal and unequal mean by having
childhood
life:

how to use them in countless

Equality

is the relationship

among two or more persons
standard

of measure.

or implied.
means.

spheres

of identity

of measure

since

of everyday
that exists

or things by reference

The standard

However,

learned

means.

to a given

may be specific

we tend to neglect what equality

2

But, equality
to decide

cannot be used as a talismanic

controversies.

amine the underlying
Although

Therefore,

substantive

it is necessary

of the history

4

to ex-

rights that conflict.3

it will not automatically

flicts, a knowledge

incantation

resolve

the con-

of the idea of equality

5
may also be helpful
which

partial

in establishing

solutions

a perspective

may be achieved

within

a little more

eaSl'Iy. 4
One of the roots of the idea of equality
perience

of the ancient

Under the covenant,
binding

Hebrews

lies in the ex-

in their covenant

God governed

through

with God.

his law which was

on all and thus a moral guarantee

to all of equal

justice.
To the Athenians

of the Fifth Century

equality

had much of the meaning

today.5

Aristotle,

building

things about equality
ever since:
unalike

"Equality

Equality

is to be equal,

The Christian
important

unalike

"There is neither

considerable

things

that are

to their unto be just

to the idea of equality

St. Paul wrote

Jew nor Greek,

were

to the Galatians:

there is neither

bond nor

for ye we are all

Jesus."
to many to discover

the idea of equality
history

before

is.

it received

7

The Declaration

how old

It possessed

a

characteristic

statement in the great legal and political
18th Century.

thought

is to be unequal."6

contributions

It may be reassuring
and pertinent

this:

in proportion

free, there is neither male nor female:
one in Christ

Western

and justice are synonymous:

and farreaching.

for us

on the work of Plato said two

in morals means

to be unjust

Christ,

it possesses

that have dominated

should be treated

alikeness.

which

Before

documents

of Independence

of the

numbered

6
among its self-evident

truths that "all men are created

equal."8
The drive to abolish
and three amendments
amendments,
guarantee

slavery culminated

to the Constitution.

the fourteenth,

of equality

son within

contains

that:

in a civil war

One of these

the one explicit

"No State shall deny to any per-

its jurisdiction

the equal protection

of the

laws."9
In recent years the Equal Protection
come the single most important
for the protection

of individual

State regulations
categories

concept

has be-

in the Constitution

rights.

are commonly

for the purpose

guarantee

placed

in one of three

of Equal Protection

(1) Regulations affecting
"fundamental rights."

the exercise

analysis:
of

(2) Regulations classifying people on the basis of
criteria that are constitutionally
suspect.
(3) All remaining
An important

factor,

regulations.IO
in determining

Supreme Court will go in enforcing
teenth Amendment,
this respect.

is the opinion

Chief Justice

Supreme Court's

decisions,

volving classifications
thinkering

with

conclusions
scrupulously

drafted

further

the

rights under the Four-

of its new Chief Justice

Rehnquist

has described

with the exception

in

the

of those in-

based on race, as an "endless

legislative

unsupported

how much

judgments,

by any guiding

dissents

a series of
principle. "12

have proliferated

His

in response

7
to the majority's

propensity

c 1aSSl'f' lca t'lons b ase d on sex,
The constitutional
in two fundamental

toward
'II
1

invalidating

' ,
egltlmacy

ideal of equality

legislative

or a I'lenage. 13
seems problematical

aspects: 14

(1) The fact that virtually all governmental action
involves the making of choices and the drawing of
lines in ways that entail favoring some over
others.
The Equal Protection clause then permits
the judiciary to step in and trump the freedom of
the political system to make these choices.
(2) The fact that the Equal Protection clause is
supposed to play itself out in a universe in which
individuals create inequalities themselves because
of the pre-existing or background system of
individual freedom.
At what point then, must the government
,
lntervene

? 15
to fl atten out t h'
ese lnegua l't'
1 lese

go back to the framers to examine

the standards

review they had in mind while drafting
mente

or the judiciary
Let us f'
lrst
for judicial

the Fourteenth

Amend-

8
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CHAPTER

B

THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
To understand
document

written

understand

the text of the Fourteenth

more than a century

the period

of slavery.

constitutional
,

,

,

of Independence

There exists

historians

..

ago, it is necessary

grew out of the conflict

tween the ideals of the Declaration
institution

h

1

slavery origins

go back to the period of 1835-1838.

movement

3

took place
4

public action.

5

a change

its abolition

arguments

and moral

private

discrimination

enforce the common

law concerning

common carriers
9

evil but

conversion;

it

The evil sought

failure to protect

against systematic

accommodations;

the ethi-

to overturn

'
6
was to b e roote d out b y po l't'
1 1ca I act1on.
was the state's

to

which employed

was not to wait upon individual

to be redressed

During

from a program

as aides to attack

Slavery was still an ethical

had

These anti-

conversion

evils of slavery to a program
as primary

among

of the abolitionist

from that of private

and liberty

liberty and equality
slavery.

reorientation

The shift entailed

which used equality
cal and moral

avery movement.

2

1n t e ant1-s

an important

and the

Amendment

1ts ma1n or1g1n

this period,

to

be-

strong agreement

that the Fourteenth
.

a

it was written. 1

in which

The Civil War Amendments

Amendment,

blacks

by refusing

access to public

and other community

to

10
facilities
state's

for the benefit

failure to provide

of blacks

and whites

"Equal Protection

The words of the Equal Protection
and, when read literally,
protection

which

its language

the jurisdiction

the same protection
extends

of the laws."7

clause are general

no limitation
to deny. 8

states are forbidden

means exactly what
coming within

express

alike the

says: namely,

on the equal
The clause

that any person

of a state has the right to

of the laws of that state as the state

to other persons

within

its jurisdiction.

It does

not mean that the laws must be the same: only the protection
must be the same.9
In spite of its clear language,
scholarly

controversy

Fourteenth

fects specific
and property,

only racially

provided

"To convert

where on a number
(1)

legislation

the security

that afof person

of section one does

to enact laws for direct

enforcement

'no state shall deny' into

shall make' does violence
This construction

Clause was in-

in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.10

that the provision

Congress

of the

by the Judiciary,"

partial

civil rights concerning

Berger says further
not empower

In "Government

understanding

argues that the Equal Protection

tended to prohibit

thereof:

over the original

Amendment.

Raoul Berger

there has been much

'Congress

to the text."ll

has been successfully

challenged

else-

of grounds:

Bickel argues that the framers did not simply use the
language of the Civil Rights Act, because they were
aware it was a Constitution they were writing:
an
organic document that because of its unique function and
permanence must contain language which allows for future

11
unforeseen problems.
In his view the framers did what
they intended to do: propose a genef21 constitutional
prohibition of inequality under law.
(2)

Ten Broek argues that the protection of the laws must be
supplied.
In other words, the absenc 0f all protection
is a ground for federal intervention.

I3

(3)

Dimond says that Berger's interpretivist theory of
judicial review fails to comprehend the Supreme Court's
institutional mission such as its role in articulating
the con~emp?~ary meaning of sweeping phrases like Equal
Protectlon.
There exists

a rather

serious question

today can hope to accurately
majority

of people

responsible

tion of the Fourteenth

specific or the general

whether

anyone

the intent of the

for the proposal

Amendment. IS

it "to ask in each instance,

variably

discern

whether

and ratifica-

As Terrance

Sandelow

put

the framers

intended

the

that almost

in-

is to pose a question

is unanswerable."16

In my opinion,
with respect

section one had a core focus

to racial discrimination,

sciously used broad
experiences

although

language

and insight.

the framers

to comprehend

con-

new circumstances,

12
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CHAPTER
JUDICIAL

SUPERVISION

The Equal Protection

Clause

OF LEGISLATIVE

CLASSIFICATIONS

Clause has meaning

as a legal force

courts give it that effect.1

only to the extent
Therefore,

C

judicial

review under the Equal Protection

raises broad problems

as to the respective

roles of

courts and legislatures.2
It is possible
sions as judicial

to rationalize

determinations

has fairly classified
for equality
Protection
classify

confronts

Clause

persons

all Equal Protection

of whether

persons.3

the government's

doctrine

rapid and drastic

Prior to the Warren
a very minor

judicial

sisted merely
"reasonably

0f

of the Supreme

was supported;

to the legislative

attention was paid to whether

Court has

Clause

played

cases.7

Only

the courts

in-

in the statute
purpose."8

the legislative

14

or

in recent years. 6

racial discrimination

that the classification

relate

criteria

. d'1V1'dua 1s. 5
1n

transformations

intervention

to

that those class-

Court the Equal Protection

role outside

ability

and applica-

will not be based upon impermissible

The Equal Protection

a minimal

The Equal

or draw lines in the creation

arb'1trar1'1y use d to b ur d en a group

undergone

the demand

the right to classify.4

tion of laws, but it does guarantee
ifications

the government

At this point,

does not reject

deci-

Very

purpose

little
itself

15
9

was valid.

Only in racial discrimination

courts

apply a stricter

ground

of the Fourteenth

The principal
vitality

during

scrutiny

cases did the

due to the historical

back-

Amendment.10

way in which

the Warren

view of when a statutory

the Clause

gained new

era was by means of a broadened

classification

should be subjected

t o st'
rlct scru t'
lny. 11 T h e courts Wl.11 not accept every permissible

government

ification

to show that it is pursuing

"overriding"

end -- one whose value

the limitation

The courts will
other branches
determine

as sufficient

to support

under this test, but will instead

government

tifies

purpose

the

a "compelling"

constitutional

values.

not defer to the decision

of government

but will

if the classification

or

is so great that it jus-

of fundamental

furthermore

require

a class-

instead

is necessary

of the

independently
to promote

such

't eres t .12
a compe II' lng ln

Strict
ever either

scrutiny

the classification

discriminated
minority,

under the Warren

against

Court was imposed when-

was a suspect

a politically

or that classification

powerless

one because

it

or unpopular

had an impact on a fundamen-

. h t or lnteres
.
t .13
ta 1 rlg
In actual
.
1 orlgln
"
tlona

tal interest

fact the Warren
t 0 be

criminal

doctrine

but the list of interests

by the Warren

appeals

T he f un damen-

of the new Equal Protection

open-ended,

tified as fundamental
voting,

found only race and na-

.
14
suspec t c 1aSSl. f'lcatlons.

ingredient

was particularly

Court

iden-

Court was quite modest:

and the right of interstate

16
travel.

15

In all other contexts,

relationship

test reigned with

and virtually

the "old" rational

"minimal

scrutiny

none in fact."16

At the end of the 1960's, it was possible
detailed

analysis

of all Supreme

sions in terms of a two-tiered

model

involving

test and the strict scrutiny

Bickel wrote

that "a broadly

conceived

main theme in the music to which
What has been the response

doctrine

might ultimately

based on illegitimacy
The Burger
standard

also probably

employed

Court,

Court's

the classification

two-tier

approach.22

classifications,
only when the

that the classification
related"

but

it had

to an "important

objective."23
there were a number of cases in which

even while voicing

standards

the Court

added an intermediate

in the areas of illegitimacy

was "substantially

Also,

In particular,

the

in the area of gender based classifications,

could demonstrate

governmental

suggested

21

to the Warren

the Court would uphold
government

and sex.

the Warren

label to classifications

Court has, however,

of review

Most clearly

the suspect

Court's

to expand

opinions

evolve.20

was the

Court marched."IB

to the Warren

in the ways that Warren-era

to extend

test.17professor

the Warren

doctrine

deci-

the rational

egalitarianism

The Burger Court has declined

has refused

to do a

Court Equal Protection

relationship

legacy?19

in theory

the traditional

of the old Equal Protection

f·1n d t h e statute

..
I .24
unconst1tut10na

the Burger

"mere rationality"

doctrine

proceeded

to

17
As a result,
about the Burger

the most
Court's

'h
t hat Equa 1 Protect1on

performance

'd'
as rema1ne

It is hard to predict
Protection

doctrine

formulated

dissents,

is the only proper
,.
"
cr1m1nat1on

in Equal Protection

Court will be.

has been adamantly

of the Burger Court.

of review where

'1'
1S not 1mp
1cate d .26

should be given maximum

too 1 .25

opposed

to

basis test

racial dis-

In his opinion,

leeway to determine

In the

In carefully

he argued that the rational

standard

is

at this point what the Equal

Rehnquist

approach

thing that one can say

"
an 1ntervent1on1st

of the Rehnquist

past, Chief Justice
the three-tier

important

states

the best solution

to their problems.27
The possibility
to this interpretation
have serious
minorities,

of a Supreme

of the Equal Protection

implications:

members

who have turned

relief was not available
f'1n d t h e courts

Court majority

from the democratic

'11 as we
unrespons1ve

Clause will

of "discrete

to the judicial

.28

subscribing

and insular"

system because
process,

will

18
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CHAPTER
APPLICATION

OF CLASSIFICATIONS
PROTECTION

Throughout
to numerous
I

latures.

alienage

American

history

restrictions

aliens have been subjected

complexity
against

problems

and State Legisconcerns

state

aliens.

These

of federalism.2In

Court held that aliens are "persons"

joy the protection

of the Equal Protection

In 1971, the Supreme
tions based on alienage
close judicial
scrutiny

CLAUSE

laws which discriminate

cases raise unique

the Supreme

UNDER THE EQUAL

imposed by Congress

One area of particular

and federal

D

Court declared

are inherently

scrutiny."4

that "classificaand subject

however,

is not as strict as in cases involving

ifications

origin.S

based upon race or national

classifications

are special

so as to en-

Clause.3

suspect

In reality,

The Supreme
classifications

classAlienage

in two respects:

is not an irrevocable

personal

Court has chosen not to analyze
in terms of a single standard

Instead the Court has employed
review -- the traditional

to

the Court's

(1) the concept of citizenship itself implies
existence of a favored status for members
specified group; and
(2) alienage

1886,

a more

rational

cases:
20

lenient

the
of a

trait.6
all alienage

of review.7
standard

basis test -- in two

of

21
(1) Local governments may require U. s. citizenship
as a condition of obtaining a government position
"ultimately relat§d to the process of democratic
self-government."
This exception is premised on the view that the
distinction between citizens and aliens, irrelevant
in other contexts, is fundamental to the definition
and government of a state.
This is paradoxal,
however, because the suspect classifications device
was intended specifically to protect minorities ~ot
adequately safeguarded by the political process.
The trend has been toward broadening this
exception, one result of which has been to diminish
the national treatment of aliens which is more
explicitly provided to some nationalitierowithin
U.S. jurisdiction by bilateral treaties.
(2) Because of the important nature of the federal
interest in foreign affairs and foreign relations
as well as the federal power to regulate immigration and naturalization,
alienage classifications
by federal
are subjected only to the rational
basis test.

tfW

The use of a preemption standard, however, would
justify the Court's differential treatment of state
and federal alienage classifications,
a difference
that i~ a£~malous under Equal Protection
analysls.
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CHAPTER
DISCRIMINATION
The Privileges

explicitly

only speaks of "citizens

possess

call for some special
(1)

Clause

prohibits

of each state,"

and citizenship

Non-residents

NON-RESIDENTS
of the United
state discrimination

of other states.1Although

the citizens

ter residence

AGAINST

and Immunities

States Constitution
against

E

the Clause

as a practical

mat-

are interchangeable.2

two characteristics

that generally

attention:

they lack the right to vote; and

(2)

~hey a:e.vul~erable to local prejudice or
lnsenslvlty.
The Framers adopted the constitutional ban on discrimination

against

of national

unification.4

Immunities

Clause

non-residents

primarily

Hamilton

deemed

after.

that their interests

and

And as Profes-

tying the fate of out-

siders to the fate of those possessing
insured

the Privileges

"the basis of the union."S

sor Ely put it "by constitutionally

Framers

as an instrument

political

power,

would be well

the

looked

6

When a non-resident

is discriminated

could in theory be actionable
Clause

7

But each clause has a separate

enforcement

of the principle

the case

under the Equal Protection

as well as under the Privileges

Clause.

against,

barring

basis of state residence.8
23

and Immunities
history

of judicial

discrimination

on the

24

Non-residency
a "suspect

(unlike alienage)

classification"

has not been held to be

for Equal Protection

scrutity

but

.
9
on 1y t 0 mere ra t'lona I'lty reVlew.
The current
plication
Immunity

Privileges

and Immunities

of the clause on whether
is fundamental.10

claimed

tal right is involved,
to determine

whether

doctrine

rests ap-

or not the Privilege
Assuming

the Court applies

the discrimination

of

that a fundamen-

the following
against

test

non-residents

11

was acceptable:

(1) the Court inquires whether non-residents were "a
peculiar source of the evil the law sought to remedy," and
(2) the Court further inquires whether the discrimination against non-residents bore "a substantial relal~onship"
to the problem the statute was attempting to solve.
The fundamentality
munities

Clause,

rationality
strict

although

review,

scrutiny

"intermediate

doctrine

of the Privileges

considerably

stricter

and Im-

than minimum

is not as rigid as the Equal Protection

test.

The doctrine

level of scrutiny"

resembles

closely

the

under the Equal Protection

Clause.13
State discrimination
tivities

does not fall within

,.
an d Immunltles

required

Cl ause. 14

to justify

rationality
Clause.1S

with respect

standard

to non fundamental

the purview

ac-

of the Privileges

In such a case the state is only

the discrimination

under the minimum

of review of the Equal Protection

25
As a result,
Protection

Clause

the Supreme Court now interprets

to limit state power to discriminate

against

in-state

limited

state power to discriminate

citizens

under both the Privileges

Equal Protection

the Equal

aliens more severely

Clause!16

than it has ever

against

out-of-state

and Immunities

and the
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CHAPTER

F

THE RIGHT TO INTERSTATE
The Freedom

of interstate

given by any constitutional
exclusion

TRAVEL

migration

is not explicitly

provision.1The

reason

for this

is not clear:

(1) It is possible that the Framers believed it to be
so basic a right that it did not need to be expressed in the
text of the Constitution.
(2) Another possibility
this guarantee to be2included
by the Constitution.

is that the Framers considered
in the other protections given

But the Supreme Court has always treated
to travel

as "fundamental"

..

Protectlon

scrutlny.

and thus triggering

is widely

considered

the right to interstate

case, the Supreme

Court held unconstitutional

one year.

In that

state and
to individuals

jurisdiction

less than

5

right to travel)
were

held that because

the right limited

and the right denied

"fundamental

to be invalidated
promote

benefits

in the administering

The majority

benefits)

denying welfare

the classic

travel.4

case illustrating

who had resided

strict Equal

3

Shapiro v. Thompson

federal provisions

this right

unless

a compelling

rights,"

(the right to welfare
the classification

it was shown to be "necessary

governmental

27

(the

interest."G

had
to

28
The Court declined
any particular
recognized

constitutional

clause.

concepts

that all citizens

of personal

tions which

unreasonably

burden

Later cases have construed
right to travel

is impaired,

ness to permit,

without

the Court

Union and our con-

throughout

by statutes,
or restrict
Shapiro

whereever

even if there is no actual deterrent
..
9But t h e Supreme
mlgratlon.

in

liberty unite to require

be free to travel

of our land uninhibited

pairments

Rather

that the "nature of our Federal

stitutional

breadth

to locate this right to travel

rules or regulathe movement."?

to mean8

of the right to travel.lO

that the

it is "penalized,"

effect

on interestate

h
Court h as a 1 so sown

triggering

the length and

strict

.. Wl 11 lng.
ltS

scrutiny,

minor

im-

29
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G

CONCLUSION
TOWARDS

A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL

I think that the authors
(the Declaration

of that notable

of Independence)

intended

but they did not intend to declare
respects.
color,

EQUALITY
instrument

to include

all men

all men equal in all

They did not mean to say all men were equal in

size, intellect,

moral developments

or social

capacity.
They defined
respects

they did consider

with certain
liberty

with tolerable

inalienable

and the pursuit

distinctness

all men created

rights,

joying

the obvious

immediately
such a boon.
enforcement

are life,

of happiness.

untruth

that equality,

equal -- equal

among which

This they said and this they meant.
to assert

in what

They did not mean

that all were then actually

en-

nor yet that they were about to confer

upon them.

In fact, they had no power to confer

They meant
of it might

simply to declare

the right so that

follow as fast as circumstances

should permit.l
How progressive
during

the 130 years that passed

were written
problem

were we in the enforcement

by President

since these famous words

Lincoln?

This was the major

of this first part of my analysis.
30

of that right

31
First,
context:

the equality

ideal was placed

the Fourteenth

constitutional

Amendment,

guarantee

focus with respect

used broad

cumstances,

experiences

of equality,

language

Rehnquist

standards

scrutiny

new cir-

of judicial

review used by

the rational

relationship

test and the intermediate

The conclusion

to predict

had a core

But the Framers

to comprehend

Court were examined:

of review.

obviously

and insights.

Then, the different

test, the strict

the one explicit

to racial discrimination.

consciously

the Supreme

in its historic

was that at this point

what the Equal Protection

doctrine

standard
it is hard

of the

Court will be.

Furthermore,

the specific

based on residence

and alienage

sion was that the Supreme
Protection

severely

and Immunities

with respect

were considered.

The conclu-

the Equal

to discrimination

against

than it has ever interpreted
or the Equal Protection

to discrimination

Finally,

of classifications

Court now interprets

Clause with respect

state aliens more
Privileges

problems

the existence

against

out-of-state

of a limited

inthe

Clauses
citizens.

right to travel was

proven.
As a result,

Americans

with the idea of liberty,
government,

generally

which

seem more concerned

they identify

with absence

of

than with the idea of equality.

In my opinion,
teenth Amendment:
stigmatization

the Court has not over-extended
A sweeping

and oppression

guarantee

the Four-

of protection

was narrowed

from

into a protection

32
of certain

kinds of discrimination

the Privileges
meaningful

and Immunities

vehicle

However,
system more

important

Therefore,
reasonableness

I believe

are the needs of the interstate

almost

ignore state lines.
in deciding

the

based on residence,

has

to state legislatures.

of local laws to local people

tional under

traditional

unsatisfying:

Decreasing

tends to strengthen
diminishes

States, where busi-

that the Court,

of classifications

been too deferential
protection

review of state actions.

than in the United

ness and social activities

Limiting

the

is obviously

ra-

tests but somehow
the significance

interstate

the likelihood

attachments

of interstate

the Privileges
"fundamental

scrutiny

rights."

Clause

analysis

that distinguish

and should therefore

is now the relevance
to choice

question

is the extent
decisions

and thereby

the fundamental

is to stop interpreting
as being

locals

limited

to

from out-of-staters

be subjected

to the strict

Clause.

of this Equal Protection

of law decisions?

in the following

to which

of state residence

But I prefer yet another method:

test of the Equal Protection

What

central

possibility

and Immunities

classifications
are suspect

Another

that seems

conflicts.

One way of doing this is by broadening
right to travel.

And

Clause has never been a

for judicial

in no country

and classification.

This will be the

chapters:

To be examined

a state may make choice of law

that apply its domestic

law to extrastate

events

33
involving
plications

its own residents

of its law to residents

In the conflicts
with

but refuse

context

to make similar

of other states.

one will not ordinarily

laws that on their face limit their protection

cals.

Therefore,

a Federal

in all cases.

can harmonize

Accordingly,

which principle
The Supreme

Court has not yet limited

clauses.

of
But no

approach

decides

to be preferred.

of law on the basis of the Equal Protection
and Immunities

possible.

of

these two principles

every conflicts

is ultimately

to lo-

and the advancement

--- should be avoided wherever

of law methodology

deal

the two basic principles

Union --- equal treatment

local values
choice

choice between

ap-

The following

a state's

choice

or the Privileges

chapters

will be a

plea for the Court to take up that responsibility.

34
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PART II.

EQUAL PROTECTION

AND CHOICE OF LAW
CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION:
In the adjudication
to effectuate
justice

two basic but opposing

their extremes,

case would

societal

conversely

objectives:

of its legal system.1

complete

justice

Extended

to

by

in the individual

in a legal relationship

a conflict

then becomes

whether

seek an accommodation

between

system by giving weight

transcend

of laws case may arise.3
to ignore the foreign ele-

ment and to treat the case as arising

under

local law, or to

the forum and the foreign

to the foreign element

legal

and applying

law.4

Conflicts

of law has always

task of solving,
international

Therefore,
disputations

struggled

with local territorial

problem,

will be decided

groups

the interests

needs would best be advanced

elements

jurisdiction,

The problem

foreign

to achieve

often call for ad hoc decisions.2

When critical
a single

THE STAGE

case and to protect

in the integrity

rigid rules;

SETTING

of any case, a court is called upon

in the individual

of society

A

namely

everywhere
conflicts

over theory.6

in conflict

with the hopeless

means,

an essentially

to assure that the same case

according

to the same law.5

is an area of the law noted
Basically,

of law thinkers:
35

however,

for

there are two

(1)

the "forum faction"

apply foreign
(2)

substantive

law only by way of exception.

the "substantivists"

tion of new rules of substantive
case.

36
thinks that the forum should

would

like to see the crea-

private

law to decide

the

7
In the United

States,

systems/territorial
law concerns
(1)
case which

facts or contacts

primarily
whether

in three different

entertain

a

i.e., jurisdiction.

if a court does hear a case, to what extent does
state or country

tion,

of law.

i.e., choice

have claim to considera-

if a court hears a case, what

the determination

or judgment

i.e., recognition

and enforcement

The second question,
is the subject

in another

namely

is the effect

of

state or country,

of judgments.8
the choice of law problem,

of this analysis.

In the United

States,

law rules is state law.9
given case its courts
from one or another

source of choice of

Each state determines

should apply substantive

whether

in a

rules taken
from federal

legal system.lO

Except when Congress
too, must

the principle

of the state legal systems,

law or from a foreign

court,

of

situations:

a court can appropriately

the law of another

(3)

legal

other than the forum raise conflict

has a foreign contact,

(2)

with

has occupied

in diversity

rules of the state in which

the field, a federal

cases apply the choice-of-law

it sits.ll

37
The influence
mainly

exercised

of the United

through

States Constitution

the limitations

it places

is
on the

power of the states to shape their own choice-of-Iaw
to the detriment
important,
states.

12

of other states of the Union,

to the detriment
However,

of the federal

change

in the landscape

United

States.

14

been to escape

Most of the efforts

from the traditional

the rules of substantive
relationship

cause of the existence

to a given set of facts
an

with the issue at hand are applied
of a given

The substantive

have

rules.15

law of that state which enjoys

fact:

the so-called

be-

"point

laws of all states are treated
according

to the same

contac.t 16 T h'1S exp I'
a1ns w h y t h e ru Ies 0 f Iex IOC1.

--- the law of the place where
with

in the

of the past decades
choice-of-Iaw

approach,

since they are all applied

'f 0
p01nt

of

a fundamental

of choice of law doctrine

Under the traditional

equally

symbiosis

in this area there is still little

The last thirty years have witnesses

of contact."

and much more

guidance.13

authoritative

intimate

rules,

the point of contact

the act occurred

--- developed

was the law

in the United

States.17
These rules trace their history
Middle

Ages.

back to Europe

Until then, the courts generally

fori, the law of the forum adjudicating
rise of international

commercial

applied

the case.

transactions,

in the
lex

With the

it became

38
important

to recognize

the law of the country

Traditional
thermore,
flexible

choice of law in the United

reflected
doctrine

vested

rights.

United

States

the tension between

of comity

Comity

paramount

law when that foreign
obligation

the relatively

and the more rigid concept

traced to the writings

1800's.19

obligations

Comity,

of nations

to give effect

law is appropriate

within

0f'

This concept was transmitted

justice.

comltas. 20

by Holland,

an English

doctrine

rights:21

Beale,

laws theorist

lawfully

his

"Any right duly acquired
is recognized

...

by the

by the

courts."22

Joseph

concept

country

As a

of a country

to Dicey, who used it to develop

law of any civilised

That

to apply

legal philosopher,
of vested

to the

to foreign

consent

the boundaries

, d th'elr va I'd'
retalne
1 lty b ecause

of Joseph

for the case.

that law, given in order to do substantial
acquired

of

in the

he said, refers

rests on the forum's voluntary

rights

States has, fur-

as a choice of law mechanism

is generally

Story in the early

English

the

act had occurred.18

disputed

result,

in which

a highly

during

the early 1900's

of "vested rights."
created

23

in the First Restatement

law a continental

the

that once a right is
it must be recog-

Beale codified

thus became

conflict-of-

further developed

He insisted

everywhere.

(1934) .24 That document
ing in American

American

in a given jurisdiction,

nized and validated
rights approach

influential

the vested

of Conflict

responsible

dogma which,

of Laws

for implantby then, had

39
long been discarded
the vested
plaining
foreign

in the countries

of its origin.25

rights theory has been subjected

only why foreign
rights

to attack

law should be applied

should be recognized

Namely,
as ex-

and not when

and protected

by the lo-

cal forum.26
The same was true of yet another American
that time:
Walter

"the local law theory"

Wheeler

27

Cook

which

Rather,

of Judge Learned

of

Hand and

saw the sole source of conflicts

law in the law of the forum:
plied.

doctrine

no foreign

the court created

law was actually

its own law patterned

ap-

after

the foreign model.28
The local law theory too has been subjected
as leaving
should

the courts without

apply.

new answers.

Legislators,

to criticism

a guide as to which

judges and scholars

law they

have sought
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REVOLUTION

AND COUNTERREVOLUTION

What has been described
Revolution"

consists

American

The development

started

practice

conflict

the First Restatement,

"Conflicts

and case law which

since the late fifties.
when a number

began to criticize

of law thinking,

was dominated

as exemplified

by the search

to the application

law wherever

cases arose.2

benefits
choice

claimed

for the First Restatement's

dermined

the system of escape devices

predictability

courts

resorted

renvoi

and public

for sen-

of the same

The principal
system

for

predictability

and

substantially

un-

and forum neutrality. 4

to such escape devices

rules which would
results.

by

(or forum neutrality).3

However,

policy

Innovative

as characterization,

to avoid literal

lead them to inequitable

application

of the

and unjust

5

Several
t'~cs. 6

contact

of law are ease of administration,

uniformity

of

the traditional

sible and clear rules leading
multiple

OF LAW

of law problems. 1

conflict

Traditional

writings

in the thirties,

law teachers

way of solving

IN CHOICE

as the American

of doctrinal

have influenced

distinguished

B

commentators

criticized

But their criticisms,

negative,

until

however

these judicial
effective,

gymnas-

were

1933 when the first major breakthrough
42

largely
came

43
with David Cavers
7

Problem."
Professor

"Critique

The chief defect

Cavers

the applicable

of the Choice-of-Law

of the traditional

systems,

argued, was that they were designed

of "jurisdiction

must blind

seminal

selecting"

rules which purported

law irrespective

of its content:

itself to the content

or principle

of selection

law may work

in the case before

in terms

to lead to
"The Court

of the law to which

points

its rule

and to the result which
it.,,8 Cavers

that

seemed to sug-

gest that choice of law be made in each case with a view to
doing

justice between

the parties.9

The central

used in the 1933 article was modeled
10

Pratt

and contained

11

tion.

in it the seeds of the Currie

that this "false problem"

.
o f governmenta 1 lnterest
Professor
terest

Brainerd

analysis

several

"Selected

Essays

Basically
steps:

First

determines
flicting

Currie

announced

on the Conflict

his interest

his governmental
in 1958.

analysis

applies

unless

laws and the state's contacts

there are three possible

in a book,

in a series of

the court then

given the policy purposes

in applying

He wrote

the law of another

If such a claim is made,

state has an interest

in-

of Laws." 13

forum law is applied

whether,

cornerstone

. 12
ana 1YS1S.

most of which were collected

state is claimed.

later

to be a "no

case, the abiding

for choice of law problems

articles

v.

revolu-

of a century

case was recognized

or "false conflict"

he

on the case Milliken

But, it was not until a quarter

conflict"

example

with the dispute,

its law.

situations:

of the coneach

At this point,

44
(1)

False conflict:
and that state's

(2)

No conflict:
no state is interested
law will be applied.

(3)

True conflict:
the situation in which the
applicable laws of two or more states connected
to the dispute differ and each state has an
interest in applying its policy.
Currie's
controversial proposal was t~at in such cases
forum law would be applied.

The decision

only one state is interested
law will be applied.

of the New York Court of appeals

..
d t he mo dern revo l' ut~on
v. J ac k son 15 ~gn~te

in the courts.
Currie's

The coincidence

collected

.... retrospect,
~n

writings

qu~te

generally

perhaps

interest
because

analysis

analysis

0f

1aw

of

in Babcock

has become

a dozen different

agrees on the process

on the recognition

c h'o~ce

of the publication

and the decision

in Babcock

is,

s~gn~ f'~cant. 16

Since then, interest
to describe

0f

and forum

of identifying

and resolution
breaks

of the variety

methods.

a term employed
Each method
interests

of false conflicts.17

into discretely

of techniques

different

for breaking

and
But

methods
true con-

flicts.
Basically,
analysis

however,

there are two groups of interest

defenders:
(1)

The orthodox whose prophet remains Brainerd
Currie perhaps with a few modifications and
reservations.

(2)

The reformists who start from other premises:
the~ mo~~fy the ingredients but stick with the
rec~pe.

Interest

analysis,

even if restricted

flicts, has been critized

to false con-

since its inception

by a

45
"counter-revolution"

led mainly

choice of law problems.
...
maJor

crltlcs

by advocates

In summary,

of rules for

the following

are the

.. pOlnts: 19
an d t h'elr maln

(1)

Cavers, after starting the conflicts revolution
returned to ~8rritorially based "principles of
preference."

(2)

Rosenberg argued that governmental interest
analysis ignores legislative policies favoring
simplicity, predictability and multistate
harmony, while it necessitates subje ive and
therefore dangerous value judgments.

2t

(3)

Scoles and Hay discussed the almost insoluble
dilemma facing courts attempting to determine
the policies and relative interests of relevant
states, 22sulting in unpredictable and ad hoc
results.

(4)

Ehrenzweig noted that Currie's analysis relied
on governmental interests while most conflicts
cases reso~~e disputes that concern only private
interests.

(5)

Brilmayer argued that Currie had a preconceived
notion of what state interests ought to be and
that he followed those a priori beliefs rather
than following actual legis~~tive intent or even
likely constructive intent.

(6)

Kegel questioned the idea underlying the
doctrine of governmental interests that states
are interested in realizing certain policies by
means of the application of their own substantive ~3w to cases involving foreign
elements.

(7)

Korn proposed that the common domicile of the
parties should be the preeminent choice of law
rule, based on the concept of a social contract
and consent of the governed, as well as corn
munallY2ghared
goals, conditions and concepts of
morals.

(8)

Leflar identified five "choice influencing
considerations" that he perceived as , "working
basis" for judicial decision making. 2

46
(9)

Reese, the reporter of the Second R §tatement,
favored the increased use of rules.
Beginning
in 1953, the American Law Institute labored for
seventeen years to produce the first official
draft of the new Restatement.
The final produce
was published in 1971 and reflects the period's
mood of flexibility and openness to new ideas,
while refusing to abandon past learning and
remaining committed to the principle of decision
according to rules to the extent that atisfactory rules exist or can be developed.

2

29

The Second Restatement's
tions is basically

to choice of law ques-

the following:

(1)

A court must follow the statutory
rule if one is available.

(2)

If there is no statutorily directed choice, the
Restatement provides specific rules to resolve
some issues.

(3)

For most issues, however, the Restatement
prescribes that the law of the state with the
"most significant ~5lationship" to that issue
should be applied.

The ultimate
relatively
precisely

goal is the development

narrow

situations.31

that rules channel

for such a

of policy

in ways that

pre d'lC t ab'l'
1 lty. 32

an

of the development

and the Second Restatement
of the choice-of-law

provoked

question.33

today is whether

should be the ultimate

of certain

of interest

widespread

analysis

re-examination

The basic dispute

the development

objective

cases should be decided
sideration

only in

is based on the belief

the application

The coincidence

States

of a large number of

The argument

choice of law method

'd
ac h'leve certalnty

choice of law

rules that will be applicable

defined

rule-oriented

United

approach

in the

of rules

in choice of law or whether

on a case by case basis after con-

enumerated

factors.34

47
The disarray

in the courts

is even worse:

(1) Half a dozen theories are in vogue among the
various states.
(2) many decisions use - openly or covertly - more
than one theory.
(3) Inconsistency between d gisions in the same
jurisdiction is also common. 3
Because
developed
flicts

neither

legislatures

a sure alternative

law must gather

breakthrough. 37

nor scholars

to the present

its breath

seem to have

confusion,

as it waits

con-

for the next

48
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C

CHOICE OF LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
If constitutional
intersystem

principles

relations

of federalism

(and the assumption

of laws.

tiona 1 conflict
tional

conflicts

reserved

wholly

of laws, despite

power as to

their power in interna-

the argument

that interna-

are a part of the field of foreign policy
to the federal government. 2
phenomenon

of federalism

that in the United

is usually

tions on the national

government

employed

States the

to convey

limita-

only, with connecting

for the states. 3

freedom

However,

in matters

more than a one-way
passes

their lawmaking

They even retained

It is a curious
notion

and implementation

cannot rest with the states.l

function

The states of the Union retained
conflict

serve to order

here is that they

do), it seems quite plain that application
of the ordering

LAW

of choice of law, federalism

deference

the obligation

to states'

rights:

requires

it encom-

of each state to give due deference

to

the laws of other states as well as to the needs of the interstate

and international

system as a whole.4

It is the place of the Supreme Court or some other branch
of the federal government

to settle issues that go to the ex-

tent of the states' power vis-a-vis
.
5
countrles.
50

other states or

Federal
several

control

over states' choices

forms:
(1)

system.
choice

51
of law might take

The constitutionalization

There

is, however,

of law solution

this creates

a danger

of a choice of law
in viewing

a single

as the only constitutional

a state of affairs

in which

one in that

future changes

are

a 1mos t' lmpossl'ble. 6
(2)
choice
Supreme

The development

of law.

of a federal common

In Klaxon v. Stentor

Court extended

Mfg. Co.7 the

Electric

the Erie8 doctrine

law of

to encompass

of law and held that a federal court sitting

choice

in a diversity

case must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which
't
1

.
9
SltS.

courts

This has been criticized

to abdicate

issues with

an opportunity

as requiring

to resolve

the federal

choice of law

less bias than state courts would presumably

have.10
(3)

The development

of a set of outer limits on

state choice of law decisions.
obviously
permits
proach

less intrusive

standards

than other approaches

or limits to evolve.

should be preferred.

Although

the Supreme

the possibility
constitutional
boundaries
principal

Such a negative

and it also

Therefore,

this ap-

Court in the past has flirted with
the choice of law, 12

law is now being viewed

for permissible

used to implement

is

11

of constitutionalizing

constitutional

control

as setting

only the

choice of law decisions.
instruments

the principles

The

which can and should be

of federalism

in the sphere

52
of choice

of law are:

and Credit

clause,

the Due Process

the Privileges

Thus far the Supreme
these clauses

problems.

14

the Full Faith

and Immunities

However

Court has shown extreme

of the Constitution

the advantages

help to produce

a principal

of extended

control

would

provincialism
American

merely

also prevent

interstate

matters

weakening

such federal

results

of state
purpose

of the

choice of law involves
matters

national

is

by

and not

solutions

are cruthe

of state power, with the consequent

of local self-government.16
States,

of law rules do reflect

principles

in result which

Second,

the two prevailing

of law are the rules and the policy

therefore

federal con-

of power at that level entails

or dimunition

in

federal con-

is a primary

and international

of local concern,

In the United
choice

which

Because

cial but every exercise
destruction

of laws.

the harmful

and jealousy,

Constitution.15

its nature

that uniformity

goal of conflict

caution

to choice of law

trol over choice of law are clear. First, more
trol would

clause and

clause.13

the Equal Protection

applying

clause,

special value

methods

approach.

judgments

for
Choice

and should

be valid only if in accord with the applicable
of substantive

justice embodied

in the Constitu-

.
17
t1on.
To contemporary
of law rules warrant
enforced.
tional

American

lawyers unconstitutional

no special discussion:

This view presupposes

law and the existence

they will not be

the suppremacy

of consitutional

choice

of constitu-

review by the
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. d"lclary. 18
]U

The only argument

constitutional

review

constitutional

provisions

rules.

However,
0f

c h'Olce

is that the Framers

the American

two serious

approach

believed

't
1

problems.

Under interest

to have an interest

tion of that law.
the specter
munities

20

21

Moreover

"

Constitutional
the constitutional

clause)

of its law

from the applicaapproach

against

raises

and Im-

non-

a state that denies

The second problem

the application
0b ]ectlons.

a state is

(under the Privileges

of its rules arguably

right to travel.

I
cause

analysis,

would benefit

of discrimination

effects

The first such problem

Such a resident-centered

or aliens.

beneficial

did not except

in the application

or the Equal Protection

residents

of law

s reac h .19

if, but only if, a resident

namely,

Constitution

to choice

that

to choice of law could pose at least

constitutional

is underreaching:

never intended

should be applied

I aw ru I es f rom

A policy

that could be made against

the

infringes

on the

is overreaching,

of local law despite

Due Process

22
review becomes
clauses

somewhat

complicated

when

seem to suggest contrasting

tions,

e.g., when the Due Process

Credit

clauses

solu-

and the Full Faith ~Ed

-

..

('

while

indicate

that foreign

the Equal Protection

"I
Irnrnunltlescause

't
pOlnt

In the following
Supreme

clause and the Privileges
d omestlc
'I

chapters,

Court controls

decisions

0

law should be applied

aw. 23

the extent to which

and has controlled

will be examined:

and

the

state choice of law

After an historical

introduction

54

on constitutional
Equal Protection

control
control

The conclusion

in general,

of choice of law decisions.

will be that coexistence

of law and federal control
is needed,

a process

constitutional
between

the focus will be on

in a flexible process

that considers

both conflict

law from the standpoint

the parties.

of state choice
of decision
of laws and

of doing justice
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CHAPTER
HISTORICAL
What

OVERVIEW

OF FEDERAL

is the measure

effected

through

Constitution?l

CONTROL

of federal control

OF CHOICE OF LAW
of choice of law

the vague words of the United

States

The answer given by the Supreme

Court has

from time to time and from field to field.2

varied

For many years,
The history

the Court exercised

of Supreme

provisions

successfully

Due Process

Supreme

Court would

ritorial

invoked with any regularity

of this century,

Court came close to engraving

Restatement.

associated

8

in the Constitution

It is probably

ter-

and Mutual

whether

a question

the vested

Beale and the First

led the American

the question

flict of laws had become

stitutional

derived

The leading cases that illustrate

in 1934 to reserve

are the

it looked as if the

with Professor

These decisions

The only

At that time, the Supreme

are New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge7
v. Liebing.

of

clauses.5

impose a constitutionally

rule on the states.6

theory

in state choice

of this century.4

and the Full Faith and Credit

In the beginning

at all.3

no control

Court intervention

law dates only from the beginning

rights

D

this approach
Life Ins. Co.
Law Institute

every problem

of constitutional

in conlaw.9

safe to say that the "modern era" of con-

restrictions

. k .10
Home Ins. Co. v. D1C

on choice of law began with the case
For in Dick, the language
57

used by

the Court could easily be read as adopting

a test which

into account

states.11

the interests

of the involved

Dick, a Texas Court was held to have violated
Clause

by applying

the laws of Texas while

it had to the case was the plaintiff's
words,

Dick established

sufficient

by itself

Texas,

lacking

issue,

lacked authority

13

it.

any interest

In

the Due Process

the only contact

domicile.12

that the plaintiff's

for imposition

58
took

In other

domicile

of the forum's

in the insurance

is in-

law:

contract

under the Constitution

at

to regulate

Since Dick, the Court has tended to give state courts a
to use their own law.14

broad discretion
Because
increased

of the economic

depression

state regulations

depression,

of business
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Court

Packers

Ass'n v. Industrial

found that both Alaska

public

interest"

solution

the governmental

interests

the scale of decision
Three years
dustrial

Court's

of the problem.17

of each jurisdiction

according

of the two states.

Employers

concern with states'

"by approving
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Ins. Co. v. In-
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Instead,

interest

The
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forum had a substantial

had "a legitimate
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later in Pacific

Accident
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in the resolution

devised was to weigh

Acc. Cornrn'n16the

he determined

in the dispute.20

interests
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that the
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was confirmed

by later
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Ins.

.
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After
years,

Watson

remaining

the Supreme

case of Allstate
portant

aspects

silent

Court,

on these issues

in 1981, decided

Ins. Co. v. Hague.
of the Hague case.

the plaintiff's

new residence

forum, Allstate

further expands

state courts

in selecting

of the after-acquired
contact

regulate
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the much discussed

There are several

their own law.

could not without

the case for its resident's

Brennan's

tacts between

the state and the controversy

tion of these contacts

interpreted

opinion

"better

of Leflar.

the case was acceptable

say something
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to choice of law:

Finally,

resulting
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.. 1eges an d Immun1t1es
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to
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rather
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than a

from the case. 26
opportunity

about federal control

in choice of law:
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was allowed

appear that, Hague was a missed
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inter-
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rule of law to serve as precedent
It would

and the aggrega-

only to a plurality
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new approach

majority
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the Due Process
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t h e d'1spute. 25 Secon,d

Faith and Credit

available
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are therefore

and Full
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In the jurisdiction
Due Process

and Full Faith and Credit

of effective
ments

more

Supreme
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by Professor

that a defendant's

should be stronger
tional purposes
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forum.29

This point

who said:

"To

with the forum state

under the Due Process

clause

for jurisdic-

than for choice of law, is to believe

is more concerned

ele-

And the con-

Silberman

contacts

have, because

affect a party much

than does an inconvenient

was made colorfully
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become unifying

and potentiality.

of a choice of law decision

severely

field, however,

clauses

Court intervention,

of great potency

sequences

and recognition

that an

with when he will be hanged

than

whether." 30
One can therefore
will

only hope that the jurisdiction

show the way to intervention

choice

of law.3l
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may have been warranted
costs and because

in the past because

however,

the greater mobility

tendency

to engage

number

justification

the different

in choice of law
it involved

simplicity.

of the people
activities

parochialism.32

few

Now,

and their greater
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that arise and has thus decreased

for accepting

time for the Supreme
a disinterested
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in multistate

of conflicts

by the Court with regard to
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it provided

cases

the

It is therefore
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and dispassionate
passions

umpire
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the

in disputes

of the states.33
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A set
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underlying

which will
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Several modern
local residents,
the American
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approaches,

run counter

federal

Equal Protection

to the established

system.35
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EQUAL PROTECTION LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Throughout

history,

arbitrary

lines have made unjustified
.

Amerlcans.

aware of this danger,

Privileges

and Immunities

stitution,

designed,

among the people

of the various

deep commitment

on states

residents,
ideals,3

Clause

to the lives of

inserted

states.2

government,

that, in placing

were moved,

not to exercise

friction

In view of the

to representative

to suppose

States Con-

to minimize

freedom to discriminate

the Framers

the

into the United

at least partly,

also seems appropriate
straints

differences

boundary

1

The Framers,

Framers'

geographical

against

it

some connon-

in part, by democratic

government

without

the consent

of

the governed. 4
Moreover,
towards

the Supreme

the states

encouraged

Court's

in the context

experimentations

deferential
of conflict

attitude
of laws, has

with new ideas and methodologies

~
. I pro bl ems
Ior
reso I'
vlng c h'
Olce o.fl' aw questlons. 5 Specla
arise,

however,

when a forum state's decision

eign law turns on the residence
in worse
against

treatment

constitutional

of the parties,

for the non-resident.

non-residents

evokes particular

system of the United
64

to apply

for-

and results

Discrimination
concerns

States

in the

not only under the
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Privileges

and Immunities

Protection

Clause.6

Supreme

It should be stressed

arguments

The traditional

"vested rights"

cases of discrimination
impersonal
all cases

choice

10

of law rules.

Brainerd

under the rug.11

support

of this contention

convincing:

.
12
c I USlons.

interest

irrespective

Currie,

however,

However,

the cases he cites in
not very
called

in order to accept his con-

one of Currie's

some other geographical

by the argument

followers

problem

arises

who has stated
if the forum
be-

choice of law rule points

location

to

discrimination

in his methodology,

analysis"

traditional

and

the tradi-

to apply its own law to its own residents

cause the forum's

contact'.

accused

are, in my opinion,

"a form of Equal Protection
refuse

of neutral

of who the

This is shown even more clearly

of Russel Weintraub,

ig-

These rules were applied

one has to believe

"governmental

basically

That system minimized

system of choice of law of sweeping

problems

would

doctrine

thanks to utilization

in the local courts,

were.

provi-

these clauses.8

of the parties.9

nored the citizenship

tional

a state's choice of law

have been made in some cases that the

of law rules applied violated

parties

that while the

on the basis of either of the discrimination

sions,7

that

but also under the Equal

Court has never invalidated

decision

choice

Clause,

as having

to

the 'decisive

Such a refusal may be based upon an unreasonable

classification

of forum residents

the forum rule would be advanced

if the policies
by applying

underlying

it and it such
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application

would not interfere

of any other

discriminate

against

When

criminatory

parties

14

to choice of law explicitly

on the basis of state citizen-

such choice of law approaches

in their application.16

'h out f urt her examlnatlon,
,,17
assume, Wlt

in applying

or residents

domiciliaries

or non-residents.18

rather

foundation

precise

excessive

important

(1)
functioning
' 1y
f alr

t hat a state has an
its
in non-

looks like a very

approaches:

B t

on domicile

of modern

it possesses
per-

for a t 1eas t two
constitutes

the most

a principle

systems:

treating

essential

to smooth

non-residents

as

as reSl'den t Si 20 an d
(2)

it also raises problems

of whether

an in-

dividual

ought to be able to get a change of law by deli-

berately

acquiring

question

occurred.

cal premise

a new domicile

21

protecting
22

However,

after the transaction

without

others

in protecting

in a way they are not interested

--- modern

approaches

in

the basic methodologi-

--- that states are interested

their own residents

potent.

a

approaches:

it jeopardizes

of federal

Domicile

h as au,
home.19

they

theories

and it caters to the general

reliance

weakness

Modern

but has no such interest

for modern

definition

cep t ion th a t everyone
reasons,

whether

its law in order to protect

domiciliaries

reasonable

are not dis-

on their face, we must now consider

are discriminatory

interest

interest

state."13

None of the new approaches

s h'lp. 15

with the legitimate

are largely

in
im-
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defining

protective

23

locals.

two articles

protection
similarly

depend

as running

to cope with the constitutional

"intermediate

solution"

of extending

whether

equivalent

to those accorded

them, and that, interest

are accorded

by local law, will

have seen fit to do for
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as Dean Ely points

Court has proceeded

case where

. 1e d to at h orne.26
entlt
27

under Article

On t h e contrary,
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challenge:

statutes

affecting

28

30

However,

the Court's

v. Hague

supplies

reasons

[cannot] depend upon the

and Immunities

decision

State."29
that it is not
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argued

in Allstate

to

treat
Ins. Co.

to suppose that the implications

were not fully considered.31
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and Im-

of one State's

as the laws of their home state would

them.

v. New

to a Privileges

thus seems to stand for the proposition

treat people

would be

of the chal-

of the statues of another

under the Privileges
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there is no

" Austln
ln

"The constitutionality

nonresidents

configuration

sufficient

Austin

IV:

the Court held that the content

home state law is irrelevant

Austin
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out, this is not the way the

lenger's

present

not be a

the Court has asked what the challenger

Hampshire

the

if he or she was

or not nonresidents

on what their legislators

Supreme

problem

by the law of his or her home state.24

protected

However,

of

only in favor of

of forum law to an out-of-stater

In other words,
benefits

interests

His device

was the so-called

about the constitutionality

In Hague,

that local residence

seven of the

is a factor on

of

which a state may constitutionally
32
law.
It is time for the Supreme

rely in applying
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its own

Court to clarify this

issue.
Dean Ely offers,
another

defense

of the constitutionality

methodologies. 33
reinforcing"
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if only as the devil's

In accordance

interpretation

he argues

of modern

of the Privileges

as Neuman

non-resident's

domicile

pose of the Privileges
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of recourse
reduces

points out, reference
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and Immunities

the broader

non-residents.
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1 economlC
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incorporated
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As a result,
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Protection

analysis,

"Automatic
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as illustrated

unity

into its

by its decision,
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issues that lurk within

and
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sooner or later the Supreme

these Privileges
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of national

against

approval

rather

The Supreme

this fuller vision

Equal Protection
involving
36
state.

unlon. 1,35

to fuse the

maintains

treatment

Thus this methodology

pur-

differential

of other states:34

differential

to the law of a
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to the law of the domicile

existing

by

than by a state in which

into a single nation by eliminating

treatment

of law.

are defined

representation.

However,
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rather
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do not need the protec-

tion of that clause when their obligations
their own state government,

conflicts

with his "representation-

that non-residents

they lack political

advocate,

the modern

of a
Court will

and Equal

view on choice
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choice

of law successfully,

states completely
prefer.

from applying

Therefore,

analysis:

how the Supreme Court could
without

limit

restraining

the

the choice of law method

they

I will go back to the first part of my

the overview

of the impact on constitutional

of the Equal Protection
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law

and Immunities

Clause.37
As we have seen, the Equal Protection
has a core focus on racial discrimination.
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used broad language

cumstances,

experiences

The Warren
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Court,

groups

Non-residency

scrutiny

either with respect

an intermediate
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unfortunately,

and Immunities

discrimination
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rests application
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to fundamental
The Burger

standard

of review.

class-
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review.
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Privileges
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But
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is "fundamental."

of this constitutional

Court now interprets

law analysis

was

the Equal Protection

to limit state power to discriminate

aliens more severely
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against out-of-staters.

of the clause on whether

The conclusion
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the strict scrutiny test

and is thus not subject to strict Equal Protection

to prevent

Privilege
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The Privileges
tended

to comprehend
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in turn, developed
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and insights.
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Clause obviously
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in-state

state power to
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against

out-of-state
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Clause

and the Equal

Simson argues that it is not likely that the
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coverage

of a particular

whether

and Immunities

or non-residents

Clause.
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by the Privileges

privilege
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fundamental."
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amount

of interstate

denial

to non-residents
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friction

generated

is highly
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right

is irrelevant

criminates

against

ard of review,
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non-residents
strict

that distinguish
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scrutiny
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and
nature
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to the enjoyment
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classification

to serve a significant
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non-residents

Professor
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of that right satisfies
Therefore,
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opinion,42
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test of the Equal Protection
are suspect because
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to the
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they tend to bring about

to persons with little or no formal or informal
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process.43

Non-residents

neither
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residents

materially

influence

fill its every seat.44

For at least three reasons,
Equal Protection
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Clause

test of modern

..
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to be a better basis

approaches

for a constitu-

than the Privileges
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On the contrary,

and Immunities

for judicial
thanks

Clause

never has

review of state ac-
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simplicity

the Equal Protection

Clause

in which
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the Supreme
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Privileges

application:

less obscure
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than that of the
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The Equal Protection
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its protection.
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is much
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(2)

and to the large number
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for the purposes

Privileges
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reasonableness

set by the Equal Protection

Under this author's
undertake

analysis,
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Protection
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of Equal

on the action of states and more

should clarify

Clause

the bounds
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on the choice-of-law

The Court
Protection
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that, although
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the Equal
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crimination
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choice-of-law
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in current use.

its authority

approach,
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